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INTRODUCTION

The use of capital punishment has been a major source of controversy in the modern world. The United States-more specifically its
*
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Supreme Court-has long struggled to find a balance between public
demand for this well established practice and criticisms about its po2
tentially arbitrary and discriminatory application.1 Ring v. Arizona
was among the most recent of these developments. There, the United
States Supreme Court held that capital defendants are entitled to jury
determination of facts which render them vulnerable to a penalty
more severe than the prescribed statutory maximum. 3 Specifically,
such factual findings can include aggravating circumstances when
such circumstances are treated as functionally equivalent to elements
of the crime of capital murder. 4 This ruling directly invalidated Arizona's capital sentencing scheme and called into question the capital
sentencing schemes of at least four other states that relied on judges
5
for both factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision.
Nebraska was among these states. Thus, the Governor quickly
called the legislature in to a special session to address the questionable status of the state's death penalty system. 6 The result of the Special Legislative Session was Legislative Bill 1 ("LB 1").7 LB 1
restructured the sentencing decision to allow juries to determine aggravating circumstances, while a three-judge panel continued to determine8 mitigating circumstances, the balancing of the two, and
proportionality review. 9 The bill was passed with special provisions
allowing it to take effect immediately.
1. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing
these conflicts).
2. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3. Id. at 609.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 608 (noting that only four states: Colorado, Montana, Idaho, and Nebraska, commit both factfinding and the ultimate capital decision to judges).
There are other states that may not conform to the edicts of Ring because the jury
determinations serve merely as recommendations and can be overridden by the
reviewing judge; however, these schemes will not be discussed at length within
this Note.
6. This took the form of a special assembly of the Ninety-Seventh Legislature, Third
Special Session of the Nebraska Legislature to "enact procedures for jury participation in the first-degree murder sentencing process as required by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ring v. Arizona" and to
"enact procedures to establish lethal injection as a means of enforcing a sentence
of death." GOVERNOR MIKE JOHANNS, PROCLAMATION OF CALL TO THIRD SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH LEGISLATURE, Legislative Journal 1, at 2 (2002).

7. L.B. 1, 97th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of chapters 28 and 29 of NEB. REV. STAT.).
8. Prior to LB 1, a capital defendant had the choice between the trial judge or a
three-judge panel containing the trial judge. The three-judge panel could also be
composed of three district judges named by the Chief Justice of the Nebraska
Supreme Court if the Chief Justice determined that the presiding judge was disabled or disqualified. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Reissue 1995).
9. L.B. 1, secs. 11-14, 97th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002) (codified as amended in
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (Supp. 2003)).
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Ring gave many death row inmates a glimmer of hope for a new
appeal on the grounds of a Sixth Amendment violation. One such inmate was Arthur L. Gales, who was convicted by a Nebraska jury of
the attempted second-degree murder of his girlfriend and two counts
of first-degree murder for the attack on her two young children.1O At
the penalty phase of Gales' trial, the sentencing judge evaluated the
presence of aggravating and mitigating factors and weighed the two
against each other. The judge concluded that the mitigating evidence
was insufficient to outweigh the aggravators, and sentenced Gales to
consecutive death sentences for the murders of the children. During
the course of Gales' sentencing proceedings, he challenged the new
sentencing structure, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial."1 Because Gales preserved the issue before the
judgment became final, he was able to challenge the judicial sentencing on appeal without implicating the retroactivity questions left unresolved by Ring.12 Gales made a number of attacks on sentencing
procedures used in his case and ultimately succeeded in having his
death sentences vacated and remanded for retrial under the new sentencing scheme. One of Gales' arguments involved a facial challenge
to the constitutionality of LB 1 on the basis that it did not allow the
jury to determine mitigators, balance aggravators and mitigators
against each other, or engage in proportionality review. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this argument by saying that neither
Ring nor Apprendi v. New Jersey,13 Ring's impetus, directly called for
such procedures. Instead, those holdings are limited to the determination of aggravating factors because of their function as elements in
this context. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court alluded to the
possibility that language in Ring casts doubt on the future viability of
this distinction.
The Gales case is unique and somewhat idiosyncratic because of its
procedural history and arguably unsympathetic defendant. 14 How10. State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 601, 658 N.W.2d 604, 609 (2003).
11. At this point, Ring had not yet been decided, so Gales based his challenge on the
language of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), and Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ring's precursors. See infra section II.D.
12. The debate raging among the circuit courts over Ring's retroactivity was recently
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct.
2519 (2004). In Schriro, the Court classified Ring's holding as procedural and
held that Ring does not apply retroactively. In doing so however, the Schriro
Court provided little guidance as to its vision of the scope of jury involvement in
capital sentencing. Id.
13. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any fact that increased the penalty beyond a
statutory maximum, other than the fact of prior conviction, must be submitted to
the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
14. Many commentators have noted a positive correlation between the number of aggravating factors evinced and the likelihood of a death sentence, such that the
more aggravators found, the more likely a death sentence. See Richard L. Wie-
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ever, despite these idiosyncrasies, Gales' arguments and the Nebraska
Supreme Court's analysis of those arguments suggest the possibility
of new developments in the United States Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence and foreshadow the significance that such developments could have on the new Nebraska capital sentencing scheme. A
critical look at the cases leading up to Ring suggests a doctrinal shift
in the U.S. Supreme Court's philosophy about the role of the capital
jury and the possibility of subsequent evolutions of these doctrines,
especially in the area of mitigating circumstances. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Ring recognized the limits of the question before it and exercised judicial restraint by limiting its holding to the facts and issues
presented by that case, as did the Nebraska Supreme Court in Gales.
However, in the course of such analyses, both courts provided dicta
suggesting the possibility for further developments when the facts
presented themselves. These glimpses into the future leave many
states, including Nebraska, in limbo as to the future legitimacy of
their new capital sentencing schemes.
Because of the tenuous position in which the Nebraska Unicameral
finds itself, this Note will examine U.S. Supreme Court doctrine in
this field in an effort to determine a navigable course through the
changing tides of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. Part II provides an overview of Nebraska's legislative response to Ring's edicts.
Part II also examines the arguments presented in Gales and the foundation of these arguments in the cases leading up to Ring. Next, Part
III analyzes these arguments with a view toward predicting both future progressions and the ultimate implications of such progressions
on the new Nebraska sentencing scheme. Specifically, section III.A
demonstrates the Court's recent doctrinal shift that emphasizes substance over form in its treatment of capital sentencing factors. Section
III.B discusses the questions explicitly left unanswered in Ring and
the Court's recognition that this shift could have greater implications
on capital sentencing jurisprudence rooted in either the Sixth or
Eighth Amendment. Section III.C then examines the Sixth and
Eighth Amendment arguments for expanding the jury's role in capital
sentencing by analyzing those factors the Court has deemed relevant.
The subdivisions of section III.C consider the jury's retributive function as the conscience of the community, the historic role of the jury in
capital cases, and modern empirical research comparing judicial sentencing with jury sentencing. Examination of these various sources
suggests, and it is the thesis of this Note, that the Court is likely to
further expand its definition of the jury's role in capital sentencing
under either Sixth or Eighth Amendment principles, which would rener, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How do Judges and Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 757, 768-69 (2002).

936

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:932

sult in the invalidation of the newly adopted Nebraska sentencing
scheme.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Road to Ring

Ring v. Arizona15 constitutes the most substantial installment in a
progression of capital punishment cases dealing with the Sixth
Amendment. This progression of cases is also closely tied to constitutional due process requirements regarding the distinction between elements and sentencing factors. These distinctions can be traced back
to In re Winship, 16 Mullaney v. Wilbur,17 and Patterson v. New York,18
as well as McMillan v. Pennsylvania,19 Almendarez-Torres v. United
States,20 and Hildwin v. Florida.21 However, for the purposes of economy, only Ring's immediate predecessors, Walton v. Arizona,2 2 Jones
v. United States,23 and Apprendi v. New Jersey2 4 will be examined in
detail.
1.

Walton v. Arizona25

In Walton, the Court held that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme
was compatible with the Sixth Amendment because the judicially-determined aggravating circumstances used to determine death eligibility qualified as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense
15. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
16. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that the accused be convicted based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged).
17. 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion, instead of allowing a State to shift the burden of proving provocation to the
defendant).
18. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (allowing the states to shift the burden of affirmative defenses to the defendant so long as the burden of proof was not reallocated merely
by designating traditional elements as affirmative defenses).
19. 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that because Pennsylvania had expressly provided in
its statute that the visible possession of a firearm was not an element, but a sentencing factor, such possession need not be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated).
20. 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that a provision allowing consideration of recidivism
simply authorized an enhanced sentence, instead of creating a separate crime,
and such provision did not overstep constitutional bounds).
21. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require the jury
to make specific findings that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to qualify a defendant for a death sentence).
22. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
23. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
24. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
25. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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of capital murder. 2 6 Jeffrey Walton was found guilty of committing
first-degree murder and sentenced to death by a judge pursuant to
Arizona law. 2 7 Arizona's sentencing scheme, at that time, provided
for a separate sentencing hearing "before the court alone" to deter28
Within that hearing,
mine whether life or death was appropriate.
the State bore the burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factors, while the defendant bore the burden of establishing
mitigators.29
At the time Walton was decided, the Ninth Circuit had recently
declared the Arizona death penalty statute to be unconstitutional.30
When Walton challenged his death sentence using the Ninth Circuit's
31
logic, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Walton argued that "every finding of fact underlying the sentencing
decision must be made by a jury, not by a judge, and that the Arizona
scheme would be constitutional only if a jury decides what aggravatand the
ing and mitigating circumstances are present in a given case
32
findings."
those
on
based
trial judge then imposes sentence
In dismissing this argument, the Court quoted Clemons v. Mississippi3 3 saying, "'[any argument that the Constitution requires that a
jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to
imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior deci34 The Court also looked to its prior decisions 35
sions of this Court."'
dealing with sentencing factors in the Sixth Amendment context to
conclude that "under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, the judge's
finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself
'convict' a defendant (i.e., require the death penalty), and the failure to
find any particular aggravating circumstance does not 'acquit' a defen36
dant (i.e., preclude the death penalty)." Based on this reasoning the
Walton Court concluded that3 7Arizona's sentencing scheme did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Id. at 648.
Id. at 645; see ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1105 (1989).
Id. at 643; see ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) (1989).
Id. at 643-44.
See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 647.
Id.
494 U.S. 738 (1990).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 647 (quoting Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745).
See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
36. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986)).
37. Id. at 649.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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Jones v. United States38

In Jones, Nathaniel Jones and his accomplices carjacked two men,
injuring one of them by shoving a gun in his ear. 39 Jones and his accomplice were each indicted on counts of using or aiding and abetting
the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and
carjacking or aiding and abetting carjacking, both of which are federal
offenses. 4 0 The statute on which the indictments were based had, at
the time, three subsections which laid out different degrees of punishment according to the resulting degree of harm.41 The indictment did
not mention any of the three subsections explicitly; nor did it charge
any of the facts required for the subsections providing greater punishment for greater resulting harm.42 Further, at the arraignment, the
magistrate judge told Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years
on the carjacking charge, and the district court jury instruction made
reference to this same fifteen-year maximum without mention of the
facts required by the remaining subsections. The jury found Jones
guilty on both counts.
Despite the fact that the indictment did not explicitly charge serious bodily injury, which was a requirement of the second subsection,
the presentence investigation report recommended a sentence of
twenty-five years for the carjacking based on the serious bodily injury
to the victim's ear. Jones argued that the twenty-five-year recommendation was improper, "since serious bodily injury was an element of
the offense defined in [subsection 2], which had been neither pleaded
in the indictment nor proven before the jury."43 The district court did
not read the subsections as separate offenses, and found that because
serious bodily injury was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, a twenty-five-year sentence was warranted on the carjacking
count. 44 The Ninth Circuit agreed and upheld the district court,
describing the subsections as sentencing factors or enhancements for
the single offense of caijacking.45
The Supreme Court, however, elected to construe the federal
carjacking statute as creating three distinct offenses rather than a
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. The three subsections read: "(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365
of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for
any number of years up to life, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V).
Jones, 526 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 232.
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46
The Court
single offense with two aggravating sentencing factors.
recognized that "[m]uch turns on the determination that a fact is an
element of an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given
that elements must be charged in the indictment, submitted to4a7 jury,
The
and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt."
Court suggested that the fairest reading of the statute would treat
serious bodily injury as an element as opposed48to an enhancement, but
recognized the "possibility of the other view." The Court stated that
the interpretation adopted by the lower courts "would . . . open [the
statute] to constitutional doubt in light of a series of cases over the
past quarter century, dealing with due process and the guarantee of
trial by jury."4 9 The Court noted that there would be serious Sixth
Amendment implications when sentencing factors enhance the penalty range for a defendant without jury consideration. Because of the
constitutional doubt cast by the lower court's reading, the Court
stated that the rules of statutory construction required that they construe the carjacking statute as "establishing three separate offenses
by the specification of distinct elements, each of which must be
a reasonable doubt, and subcharged by indictment, proven beyond
50
verdict."
its
for
mitted to a jury
5
3. Apprendi v. New Jersey l

In Apprendi, the Court addressed the question of "whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require[d] that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
be made by a jury
sentence for an offense from [ten] to [twenty] years 52
The case arose
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
because the defendant Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several bullets
into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved
53
When arrested, he stated
into a previously all-white neighborhood.
that he did so "'because they are black"' and because he did "'not want
54
A New Jersey Grand Jury returned a
them in the neighborhood."'
twenty-three-count indictment, although none of the counts referred
to the hate crime statute, nor alleged that he acted with a racially
biased purpose.55 Apprendi ultimately pled guilty to two counts of
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240 (basing this conclusion on Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson).
Id. at 252.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999)).
Id.
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count of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.56 As a condition of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to request that
the court impose an enhanced sentence for the count based on the
shooting because of Apprendi's purportedly57 biased purpose. 5 S At the
same time, Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the hate crime sentence enhancement. Apprendi's guilt was
established at the plea hearing, and the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the shooting was "motivated by racial bias"
and "with a purpose to intimidate," thus the hate crime enhancement
applied.5 9 The trial court then rejected Apprendi's constitutional
challenge, sentencing him to a twelve-year term of imprisonment for
the shooting, and to shorter concurrent sentences on the two other
60
counts.
On appeal, Apprendi argued that the "Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon
which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."61 As basis for this claim, he cited In re
Winship,62 which held that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.63 The appeals court was not convinced and relied on McMillan v. Pennsylvania64when finding that the state legislature had, consistent with its established power, opted to make the hate crime
enhancement a sentencing factor, not an element of the underlying
offense.65 A divided New Jersey Supreme Court, affirmed the appeals
court decision, because in its view "the statute did not allow impermissible burden shifting, and did not 'create a separate offense calling for
a separate penalty."'66 The New Jersey Supreme Court further asserted that "the Legislature simply took one factor that has always
been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight given to that factor."67 Nonetheless, both state
courts conceded that the New Jersey statute at issue differed from McMillan's insofar as it increased the maximum penalty to which a defendant was subject.
56. Id. at 469-70.
57. Apprendi made the statement regarding his motive at 6:04 a.m., after extended
questioning following his arrest at 3:05 a.m. and later retracted the statement.
See id. (citing New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999)).
58. Id. at 470.
59. Id. at 471.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
63. Id. at 364.
64. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
65. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
66. Id. at 473 (quoting New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 494-95 (N.J. 1999)).
67. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorariand reversed
the state court decisions, holding that it is unconstitutional to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed penalty range. 68 Specifically, based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
"'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'69 The Apprendi Court
noted its reliance on the reasoning laid out in the Jones opinion by
suggesting that its holding "was foreshadowed by [its] opinion in
Jones v. United States."70 The Court stated that both Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment jury trial rights
were jeopardized in this case, and that "[t]aken together, these rights
indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,
'
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 71
The Court in Apprendi came to this conclusion after conducting a
historical review. That review revealed that, at common law, no distinction existed between elements and sentencing factors. Instead, indictments stated the case with sufficient precision that the defendant
was given notice of the sentencing range in order to prepare his or her
defense accordingly. 72 The Court emphasized the idea of judicial sen73
tencing discretion "'within fixed statutory or constitutional limits"'
when disapproving removal from the jury of facts that increase the
prescribed statutory maximum. 74 The Apprendi Court described the
instant statutory distinction between elements and sentencing factors
that result in increases beyond the maximum statutory sentence as
one of form over substance, because such factors fit "squarely within
the usual definition" of elements.75 Apprendi's holding was limited to
noncapital cases, because the Court specifically exempted Walton
from its holding, despite a vigorous dissent in Apprendi that ques76
tioned the logic of that approach.

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 476.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995), and citing
alternatively Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993), and In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 482 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 494 n.19.
Id. at 522-23; see also id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Ring v. Arizona77

Ring implicated the same sentencing scheme reviewed in Walton,
but with a drastically different result. The Court in Ring invalidated
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme and overturned Walton to the extent that it allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to determine aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death
penalty. The Ring Court reasoned that "'the dispositive question ...
is one not of form, but of effect,"' and "'[i]f a State makes an increase
in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a
fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'78 Further, "a defendant may not be
'exposed... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive
if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone."79
In Ring, defendant Timothy Ring was convicted by a jury of felony
murder for his involvement in an armored car robbery wherein the
driver was shot in the head and killed.80 Ring was also charged with
premeditated murder, but the jury deadlocked six-to-six on whether
there was enough evidence to prove premeditation.S1 The trial court
later stated that, "'the evidence admitted at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ring] was a major participant in the
armed robbery or that he actually murdered [the driver], because
there was no evidence placing him at the scene of the crime.'"82 Between Ring's trial and sentencing hearing, one of his accomplices pled
guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against Ring at
his sentencing hearing. When called by the prosecution, the accomplice testified that Ring shot the driver and took a leadership role in
planning the robbery.8 3 The accomplice also testified that Ring later
chided his accomplices for not congratulating him on his
marksmanship.84
Felony murder is a first-degree offense in Arizona, but the statutory scheme Ring was sentenced under required a separate sentencing
hearing in which "the court alone" was to make all factual determinations.8 5 Further, the judge was to sentence the defendant to death
only if at least one aggravating factor was present and "there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leni77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original)).
Id. at 589-91.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 591 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001)).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 591; see also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703, -1105 (West 2001 & West
Supp. 2001).
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ency."8 6 The trial judge imposed a death sentence based on the accomplice's testimony that Ring was the shooter and a major7
participant in a "crime which carries with it a grave risk of death."8
The judge determined that two aggravating factors were implicated as
was one nonstatutory mitigator. Specifically, the trial judge determined that Ring committed the offense "in expectation of the receipt,
of [something] of pecuniary value,"88 namely the cash from the armored car. The judge also found that the offense was "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"8 9 because of the comment he made
expressing pride in his marksmanship. 9 0 The trial judge determined
that any hope for mitigation revolved around Ring's minimal criminal
record, but that such evidence was not sufficient to justify leniency. 9 1
Ring's argument on appeal to the state supreme court was that
"Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate[d] the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it entrust[ed] to
a judge the finding of a fact raising the defendant's maximum penalty."92 However, the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed Ring's constitutional attack, holding instead that it was bound by the Supremacy
Clause to apply Walton because the Court had explicitly declined to
overrule it in Apprendi. Ring then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which then granted certiorariand overturned Walton, based on
the logic of Apprendi. Thus, within twelve years, the U.S. Supreme
Court completely reversed itself as to the treatment of sentencing factors in capital cases.
The logic and reasoning employed by the Court in Ring is discussed
at greater length in subsequent sections of this Note in order to obtain
a more elaborate picture of the Court's future intentions. Thus, for
the sake of economy, it is not belabored here.
C.

Nebraska's Special Session: Legislative Bill 1

Ring directly invalidated Arizona's capital sentencing scheme and
called into question the capital sentencing schemes of at least four
other states that relied on judges for both factfinding and the ultimate
86. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592; see also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703(E)-(F) (West
Supp. 2001).
87. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594. These specific findings were necessary based on the doctrines of Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S.
782 (1982), which establish limitations on the scope of felony murders which are
constitutionally eligible for capital punishment because of Eighth Amendment
considerations for proportionality.
88. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (West Supp. 2001).
89. Id. § 13-703(F)(6).
90. Ring, 536 U.S. at 595.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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sentencing decision: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. 9 3
Thus, like its sister states in this endeavor, Nebraska scrambled to
repair its broken death penalty system. 94 To address this new constitutional infirmity with minimal impact on the state's capital defendants, the Governor elected to call the state's second Special Session for
the Ninety-Seventh Legislature. The result of the Special Legislative
Session was Legislative Bill 1.95 LB 1 restructured the sentencing decision to require juries to determine aggravating circumstances and a
three-judge panel to then determine mitigating circumstances and
weigh the aggravators against the mitigators. 9 6 The panel is also instructed to conduct a proportionality review with regard to both the
crime and the offender. 9 7
Prior to LB 1, a judge made the entire sentencing determination,
although a capital defendant did have a choice between the trial judge
or a three-judge panel containing the trial judge. 98 The process began
by determining death eligibility based on a list of statutory aggravators, at least one of which had to be met in order to impose a
death sentence. Next, the judge considered mitigating circumstances,
starting with a nonexhaustive statutory list, and weighed the aggravator or aggravators against any mitigators found to determine the
appropriate sentence.
Under the new scheme created by LB 1, the line of demarcation
between the judge's and the jury's duties has shifted, such that juries
now are involved in the sentencing process by determining aggravators. The remainder of the process remains largely unchanged.
However, LB l's provisions enable the trial jury to be retained for the
93. See id. at 608 n.6 (noting that only four states commit both factfinding and the
ultimate capital decision to judges). There are other states that may not conform
to the edicts of Ring because the jury determinations serve merely as recommendations and can be overridden by the reviewing judge; however, these schemes
will not be discussed at length within this Note.
94. This took the form of a special assembly of the Ninety-Seventh Legislature, Third
Special Session of the Nebraska Legislature to "enact procedures for jury participation in the first-degree murder sentencing process as required by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ring v. Arizona" and to
"enact procedures to establish lethal injection as a means of enforcing a sentence
of death." GOVERNOR MIKE JOHANNS, PROCLAMATION OF CALL TO THIRD SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH LEGISLATURE, Legislative Journal 2, at 2 (2002).

95. L.B. 1, 97th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of chapters 28 and 29 of NEB. REV. STAT.).

96. Id. secs. 11-14 (codified as amended in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522
(Supp. 2003)).
97. Id. sec. 14(3) (codified as amended in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (Supp.
2003)).
98. The three-judge panel could also be composed of three district judges named by
the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court if the Chief Justice determined
that the presiding judge was disabled or disqualified. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520
(Reissue 1995).
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aggravation phase or allow a new jury to be impaneled in the event
that no jury was used during the trial phase.99 This might arise because the defendant pled guilty or nolo contendere or waived the jury
right at trial. Similarly, under the new scheme the defendant retains
the ability to waive the right to jury determination of aggravating circumstances.1 0 0 Further, under LB 1 the three-judge panel must come
to a unanimous decision in favor of death.1O1 If the panel is unable to
reach a unanimous decision, then a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole must be given.1 0 2 The possibility of life imprisonment
without parole differs from the prior scheme, which instead used the
term "life imprisonment." 0 3 LB 1 was passed with the emergency
clause,i 0 4 and these changes went into effect on November 22, 2002,
while Gales' appeal was pending.
D.

The Gales Court and the Scope of Ring

Arthur L. Gales was convicted by a Nebraska jury of the attempted
second-degree murder of his girlfriend, Judy Chandler, as well as two
counts of first-degree murder for the attack on her children, LaTara
and Tramar. 105 The charges against Gales were based on the State's
theory that Gales took Judy Chandler out for the evening, leaving
10 6
thirteen-year-old LaTara and seven-year-old Tramar at home.
While out, Gales and Chandler had a disagreement, which left Chandler severely beaten and incoherent on a street corner near her
home.1 0 7 Although Gales denied any involvement in the crimes, the
State proposed that Gales left Chandler for dead, and when he realized that the two children could link him to her that night, he returned to the apartment to kill them, thus eliminating any possible
witnesses.108 At trial, Gales did not refute the State's theory. Instead, he claimed that he was not the person who harmed Judy Chandler and her children.1 09 The State presented DNA evidence linking
99. L.B. 1, sec. 12, 97th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002) (codified as amended in NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (Supp. 2003)).
100. Id. sec. 11(3) (codified as amended in NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520(3) (Supp. 2003)).
101. Id. sec. 14 (codified as amended in NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Supp. 2003)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The emergency clause is a statutory provision frequently added to important legislation, enabling that legislation to take effect immediately upon the Governor's
signing of the bill. Without this provision for immediate effect, the bill would not
become effective until three calendar months after the last day of the legislative
session.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 601, 658 N.W.2d 604, 609 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Gales to both crime scenes. 110 Further evidence suggested that
LaTara had been sexually assaulted prior to being manually strangled, and that Tramar had died as a result of both manual strangulation and drowning in the family bathtub."l1
The examining
pathologist testified that both children had been strangled continuously for at least four minutes before death.112
Following the entry of the judgment, but prior to the sentencing
hearing, Gales filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the
Nebraska capital sentencing statutes based on Jones1 13 and Apprendi,114 claiming that "the Defendant is entitled to a new trial for
jury determination of sentence," or, in the alternative, "for jury deter5
mination of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.""
This motion was heard and overruled at the commencement of the
sentencing hearing.116 The trial judge conducted the sentencing hearing and found four aggravating circumstances, which were enumerated in state statute.1 7 First, the judge found that Gales had been
"convicted of another crime involving the use or threat of violence to
the person."118 Second, the judge found that Gales murdered the two
children to conceal his involvement in the beating of Judy Chandler."l 9 Third, the court found the murder of LaTara to be "especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifest[ing] exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence" based on the sexual assault and manner of strangulation.120 Fourth, the judge determined
that "at the time the murder was committed, the offender also committed another murder," based on the deaths of both children.
The court, in determining and weighing the mitigating circumstances, held that no statutory mitigators were triggered, while only
one nonstatutory mitigator was identified: Gales' close ties to his family.121 The court held that the mitigator did not outweigh the ag110.
111.
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (holding that the provisions of the carjacking statute
in question set forth separate offenses with distinctive elements not just sentencing factors, and as such each must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict).
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact that increased the penalty beyond
a statutory maximum, other than the fact of prior conviction, must be submitted
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
Gales, 265 Neb. at 601-02, 658 N.W.2d at 609.
Id. at 602, 658 N.W.2d at 609-10.
Id. at 601-02, 658 N.W.2d at 609-10.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a) (Supp. 2003). Gales had previously been convicted of armed sexual battery and strong-armed robbery. Gales, 265 Neb. at
602, 658 N.W.2d at 609.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(b) (Supp. 2003).
Id. § 29-2523(1)(d).
Gales, 265 Neb. at 603, 658 N.W.2d at 610.
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gravators in the case of either murder, nor was the sentence of death
disproportionate or excessive in comparison to similar cases. 12 2 The
court thus imposed consecutive sentences of death on each count of
first-degree murder and a sentence of imprisonment for a period of
23
fifty years on the count of attempted second-degree murder.1
Gales appealed, contending that the district court "erred in denying appellant's motions challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska
Revised Statute section 29-2519 (1995) et seq. and requesting a jury
determination of sentencing issues."124 In considering the outcome,
the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the United States Supreme
Court precedents in this area culminating with consideration of the
1 27
1
Court's recent doctrinal shift from Walton 1 2 5 to Jones, 26 Apprendi,
8
and Ring.12 The court determined that, although Walton was the
controlling Sixth Amendment precedent when Gales was sentenced to
death, a sentence is not a final judgment until the entry of a final
mandate by an appellate court. Because an automatic direct appeal of
Gales' sentence was not yet final, the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed
with Gales that Ring was the controlling precedent. This was due
largely to the fact that Gales had preserved his Sixth Amendment
challenge prior to his sentencing. However, the court disagreed with
Gales as to the scope of Ring's Sixth Amendment protection.
Gales argued that a jury must determine the presence and weight
of aggravators, the presence and weight of mitigators, the balancing of
12 9
the two, and also the proportionality of the penalty to similar cases.
The Gales court however, read the claim presented in Ring as limited
to the presence of aggravating factors. 130 The Nebraska Supreme
Court explicitly interpreted "Ring as affecting only the narrow issue of
whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine
the existence of any aggravating circumstance upon which a capital
122.
123.
124.
125.

126.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme did not
violate the Sixth Amendment and was not required to designate its sentencing
factors as elements, nor to mandate that jurors engage in factfinding for sentencing issues).
526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (holding that the provisions of the carjacking statute in question set forth separate offenses with distinctive elements not just sentencing factors, and as such, each must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict).
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact that increased the penalty beyond
a statutory maximum, other than the fact of prior conviction, must be submitted
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (overruling Walton "to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty").
Gales, 265 Neb. at 623, 658 N.W.2d at 623 (2003).
Id. (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4).
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sentence is based."'13 1 In making this determination, the Nebraska
Supreme Court looked to language in Ring that was buried in a footnote. Footnote four enumerated the precedents not currently overruled by Ring.13 2 Sixth Amendment claims respecting mitigating
circumstances and the ultimate determination by the jury were
among those unaddressed. 1 33 This is not surprising in light of the fact
that Ring based his appeal on Apprendi and Jones, neither of which
raised the issue of the role of mitigation in the Sixth Amendment
context.
The Nebraska Supreme Court went on to note that, at the time of
Gales' trial and sentencing, Nebraska's capital sentencing scheme was
very similar to Arizona's, and Ring thus required that the aggravating
circumstances used to justify Gales' death sentence be determined by
a jury rather than a judge.13 4 On these grounds, the Nebraska Supreme Court was forced to vacate Gales' death sentences. Although
Gales argued that the court should impose a sentence of life imprisonment, the State argued that the appropriate relief would be an order
to remand to the district court to conduct a new penalty phase hearing. During that hearing, a new jury would consider the aggravating
circumstances, and a judge would determine the ultimate sentence in

131. Id. at 624, 658 N.W.2d at 624.
132. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. Footnote four states:
Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth
Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him. No aggravating circumstance related to past convictions in his case; Ring therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that the fact of prior conviction may be found by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum sentence. He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to
mitigating circumstances. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490-491, n.16 (2000) (noting "the distinction the Court has often recognized between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation" (citation omitted)). Nor does he argue that the Sixth Amendment
required the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose
the death penalty. See Proffitt v. Florida,428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[Ilt has never [been] suggested that jury sentencing is
constitutionally required."). He does not question the Arizona Supreme
Court's authority to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances after that court struck one aggravator. See Clemons v. Missisippi, 494 U.S.738 (1990). Finally, Ring does not contend that his
indictment was constitutionally defective. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477
n.3 (Fourteenth Amendment 'has not.., been construed to include the
Fifth Amendment right to "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury').
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
133. See id.
134. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-105.01, -303 (Supp. 2003) (disallowing the imposition
of a death sentence absent the existence of at least one aggravating factor as set
forth in section 29-2523).
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accordance with sections 29-2520 and 29-2522 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.135
Ultimately, the Nebraska Legislature resolved the dilemma by enacting LB 1, which amended various statutes dealing with the capital
sentencing scheme.1 36 The Nebraska Supreme Court cited two
changes as significant. First, the new sentencing scheme required an
aggravation hearing wherein a jury determines aggravating circumstances alleged by the State. Second, the new scheme provided solely
for sentencing by a three-judge panel, removing from the defendant
the option of a singular trial judge or a three-judge panel. The legislature also changed the minimum penalty for a Class IA felony from
37
"life imprisonment" to "life imprisonment without parole."1
Gales made several arguments why the provisions of LB 1 should
not be applied to his case on remand, which the Nebraska Supreme
Court interpreted as facial challenges to the constitutionality of LB 1.
One of these arguments was premised on the apparent doctrinal shift
in the cases leading up to Ring. Although Gales acknowledged that
Ring was silent on the issue, he argued that the court should construe
Apprendi's definition of the jury's role as including mitigating facts
and proportionality review.138 This argument was rejected by the
court because the court, felt that it was the "determination of 'death
eligibility' which exposes the defendant to greater punishment," thus
triggering the Sixth Amendment protections afforded by Apprendi and
Ring.139 The court went on to explain:
In contrast, the determination of mitigating circumstances, the balancing of
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, and proportionality review are part of the "selection decision" in capital sentencing, which,
under the current and prior statutes, occurs only after eligibility has been determined . . . . These determinations cannot increase the potential punish-

ment to which a defendant is exposed as a consequence of the eligibility
determination. 140

The Gales court pointed out that Walton was not entirely overruled by
Ring, regardless of any doubt cast on its "future viability."141
In addition to appealing to Apprendi's language favoring restoration of the traditional jury role, 14 2 Gales also presented arguments
135. Gales, 265 Neb. at 625, 658 N.W.2d at 626.
136. L.B. 1, 97th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002) (codified as amended in NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2522 (Supp. 2003)).

137. Id. sec. 1 (codified as amended in NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105 (Supp. 2003)).
138. Gales argued that since Ring relied on and was the natural product of Apprendi,
that Apprendi can be used as the basis for its expansion. Gales, 265 Neb. at 628,
658 N.W.2d at 626.
139. Gales, 265 Neb. at 628, 658 N.W.2d at 626.
140. Id. at 626, 658 N.W.2d at 626-27.
141. Id. at 628, 658 N.W.2d at 629 (noting that Walton specifically upheld the constitutionality of judicial sentencing).
142. See discussion infra subsection III.C.2.
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that Ring constitutes a substantive change in the law that does not
cover later-enacted statutes, that the "life imprisonment without parole" change would subject him to a more dubious penalty than he was
originally subjected to pre-LB 1, thus constituting an ex post facto violation, and that even if LB l's changes are procedural in nature, they
cannot apply upon remand, because his conviction had not been vacated. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the changes to be procedural in nature and ultimately concluded that:
The provisions of LB 1 shall apply to Gales' new penalty phase hearing,
with the following qualifications: First, the minimum penalty to which Gales
may constitutionally be exposed on resentencing is life imprisonment, not life
imprisonment without parole. Second, at the aggravation hearing to be conducted on remand pursuant to section 29-2520 as amended by LB 1, the State
may seek to prove only those aggravating circumstances specified in LB 1,
section 15, to be codified as section 29-2523(1)(a), (b), (d), and (e), with respect
to the murder of LaTara and the aggravating circumstances specified in LB 1
section 15, to be codified
as section 29-2523(1)(a), (b), and (e), with respect to
143
the murder of Tramar.

In sum, the Gales court recognized the constitutional infirmity of
the old Nebraska capital sentencing scheme in light of Ring's new developments, and because of Gales' unique procedural posture and the
swift actions of the legislature, it authorized resentencing under Nebraska's new sentencing scheme provided by LB 1. What remains to
be seen is whether the U.S. Supreme Court will revisit the doctrines
implicated by footnote four in Ring, and if so, how long this new sentencing scheme will withstand attack.
III.

ANALYSIS

In the perpetual jousting match that is the Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence, Nebraska's new capital sentencing scheme survived the first pass when the Gales Court upheld the new scheme in
terms of its bare compliance with Ring. However, this is not to say
that the new scheme is immune from further scrutiny. There are
many indications that the Court intends to go further in its restoration of the jury's role in capital sentencing, either in the form of expanding Sixth Amendment protections, or through the use of the
Eighth Amendment's emphasis on the need for employing community
sentiments to determine proportionality and culpability. As Gales'
lawyers posited and as the Nebraska Supreme Court itself recognized,1 4 4 the United States Supreme Court seems to be embarking on
143. Gales, 265 Neb. at 636, 658 N.W.2d at 632.
144. In Gales, the Nebraska Supreme Court hinted at its recognition of problems to
come when stating:
[Wle note that the constitutionality of judicial sentencing was specifically upheld in that portion of Walton v. Arizona... which was not overruled by Ring. Walton thus remains binding constitutional precedent on
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a shift in orientation with regard to the role of the jury in modern
capital punishment jurisprudence. Because of Nebraska lawmakers'
decision to restrict the jury's role to the minimum requirements of
Ring, the next phase in the jousting match may leave them trudging
back to session to expand the sentencing scheme yet again.
A.

Doctrinal Shift: Substance Over Form

The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment precedents have undergone some transitions over the years. The most recent transition reflects an emphasis on substance over form and a rejuvenated sense of
importance for the role of the jury. This rejuvenated role reflects the
Court's new-found appreciation for the unique perspectives offered by
the jury and its function in capital sentencing. This regeneration is
likely to either carry over into its future definitions of the jury's role in
capital sentencing or to serve as a driving force in that movement.
Such a transition, as reflected in the Supreme Court's recent Sixth
Amendment precedents, suggests the likelihood that the jury's role
will be expanded further into the sentencing determinations to all
forms of factfinding. This approach implicates fact determinations related to mitigating circumstances and possibly even to the ultimate
balancing of relevant factors, insofar as doing so provides a means for
assigning weight to those factual findings. The expansion of the jury's
role to such an extent would have detrimental implications on the narrowly drafted Nebraska sentencing scheme. Thus, to determine the
implications of this new-found role, it is necessary to evaluate the reasoning and logic driving the Court's transitions.
Since the Sixth Amendment jury trial right was incorporated by
14 5
the Fourteenth Amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court has
expressed a desire to preserve the historic integrity of the jury. However, since that time, commentators have noted that the jury's prominence has been eroded over the years to a shadow of its former self.146
One of the contributing factors to the jury's demise in terms of capital
this issue, which we are obligated to follow even if we were to read Ring
as casting doubt on its future viability. The U.S. Supreme Court has
clearly stated that "[i f a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
265 Neb. at 629, 658 N.W.2d at 627 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson /
Am. Exp., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)) (citation omitted).
145. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
146. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 81-118 (1998) (describing the historical role of the jury and the zealous protection of that role by both federalists and
antifederalist founding fathers).
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cases was the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia147 and
its progeny. Focus on the arbitrary and discriminatory application of
the capital sentencing selection process led the Court to be leery of
juror discretion. Because of this, subsequent opinions have encouraged state lawmakers to construct sentencing schemes wherein
judges conduct the sentencing analysis. This is based on the logic that
judges are more experienced arbiters of the law, and thus they are
likely to yield more consistent sentencing results.148 At the same
time, the Court, through other opinions, sought to provide deference to
the states to formulate and structure their own criminal codes. Patterson v.New York 149 demonstrates this trend. By allowing the states
to shift the burden of affirmative defenses to the defendant, so long as
the burden of proof was not reallocated merely by designating traditional elements as affirmative defenses, the Court retreated from Winship150 and Mullaney.151 Prior to Patterson, the Court relied on a
bright line rule stating that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."152 This trend of allowing states to get creative with the criminal code structures played a major role in the erosion of the jury's role in capital sentencing. 153 By parceling off
element-like factors into sentence enhancers, states were able to
147.

148.

149.
150.

151.

152.
153.

408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty at that time
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because it was administered in an
arbitrary manner).
See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) ("[It would appear that
judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the
imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is
more experienced in sentencing than ajury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.").
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that the
accused be convicted based on "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he [or she] is charged").
421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause "requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion,"
instead of allowing a State to shift the burden of proving provocation to the
defendant).
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
The majority in Jones provides a good overview of how this deterioration occurs.
526 U.S. 227, 243-44 (1999). See also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989)
(per curiam) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require specific findings authorizing the imposition of a death sentence to be made by the jury); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that because Pennsylvania
had expressly provided in its statute that the visible possession of a firearm was
not an element, but a sentencing factor, such possession need not be proven by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights were not violated); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (noting that
the Sixth Amendment has never been construed as guaranteeing a right to jury
sentencing).
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evade both the due process demands of Winship and Sixth Amendment constrictions, because these crucial determinations occurred
within the sentencing rather than the trial phase.154 However, this
erosive effect on the constitutional rights of defendants has not gone
unnoticed or unchallenged.
The line of recent cases that culminated in the Ring decision
helped turn the tide. First, in Jones v. United States, the Court
launched an attack against this erosive technique by construing the
federal carjacking statute as defining three distinct offenses instead of
a single offense with two aggravating sentencing factors.155 Of constitutional significance to the Court was the possibility of Sixth Amendment erosion by "remov [ing] from the jury the assessment of facts that
alters the. . . prescribed range."15 6 The Court was particularly attentive to the historical roots of the jury trial right. 157 The Court voiced
its concern by saying, "[i]t is therefore no trivial question to ask
whether recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a line must
be necessarily drawn." 158
The Jones Court concluded its discussion by stating:
It is not... that anyone today would claim that every fact with a bearing on
sentencing must be found by a jury .... The point is simply that diminishment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts determining a
statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier contro15 9
versies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.

Although this statement in Jones would seem to suggest a desire to
maintain the Sixth Amendment line drawn by Ring, this is not entirely clear in view of subsequent statements. Specifically, later in the
opinion the Jones Court assuaged dissenters' concerns about upsetting state sentencing schemes by stating: "If the constitutional concern we have expressed should lead to a rule requiring jury
determination of facts that raise a sentencing ceiling, that rule would
in no way constrain legislative authority to identify the facts relevant
to punishment or to establish fixed penalties."160 The Court went on
to say that to the extent that the states' "policies conflict with safe154. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that a provision allowing consideration of recidivism simply authorized an enhanced sentence, instead of creating a separate crime, and such provision did not overstep
constitutional bounds).
155. 526 U.S. at 252.
156. Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 244-48.
158. Id. at 244.
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id. at 252 n.11. When considering the Court's comments here it is also important
to recall that a state cannot mandate the imposition of a death sentence;
sentencers must be allowed to consider particularized mitigating factors. Roberts
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guards enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused,
those policies have to yield to the constitutional guarantees."161
Individual justices have also weighed in on their satisfaction with
the Jones holding. First, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, suggests
that, in his view, "a proper understanding of this principle encompasses facts that increase the minimum as well as the maximum permissible sentence, and also facts that must be established before a
defendant may be put to death."162 Second, Justice Scalia, in a separate concurrence, stated that, in his view, "it is unconstitutional to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed." 16 3 Although these comments are arguably somewhat ambiguous as to whether they refer to death eligibility or to sentencing
determinations in general, if viewed as referring to sentencing determinations in general, it would seem that their comments would require an expansion of the jury's sentencing role.
This concern for jury determination of all facts necessary to alter
the range of penalties would seem to suggest an interest in requiring
juries to determine the presence of both aggravators and mitigators,
in addition to evaluating the balance between the two, because consideration of these facts contributes to the determination of the appropriateness of the death penalty in an individual case.1 64 Namely,
although aggravators can be said to establish who is death-eligible in
the sense that they are one vital aspect of that determination, the ultimate decision is not made in a vacuum. It is illogical to draw a Sixth
Amendment line in the middle of the sentence-determination process,
because the presence and weight of mitigators must be considered as
part of the ultimate question. A more principled approach would demand these considerations to be viewed as a jurisprudential yin-yang,
wherein a single sentencer must determinate the presence of both
classes of factors and conclude the analysis by balancing one against
the other to evaluate the ultimate propriety of a death sentence.
Apprendi likewise recognized the historic role of the jury and reiterated concerns for the erosion of Sixth Amendment protections by the
overzealous designation and use of sentencing factors. There, the
Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasona-

161.
162.
163.
164.

v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam), reaffg Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 n.11.
Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
However, this may depend on whether the statements made in Jones were intended to be directed at death eligibility determinations as opposed to the ultimate sentencing determinations.
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ble doubt." 1 65 The Court described the "New Jersey procedure chal-

lenged in [Apprendi as] an unacceptable departure from the jury
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system."'16 6 In support of its holding, the Court looked again to historic
practice, noting that the English trial judge had very little sentencing
discretion, because the law clearly prescribed specific penalties for
specific offenses. 16 7 In this sense, the sentencing determination was
not to be made by the judge, but determined by the law and announced by the judge. The Court noted that the remaining authority
was in the jury to undermine the inevitable sentence by acquitting
168
against the evidence or finding guilt to lesser included offenses.
This concept of judicial sentencing discretion within fixed statutory or
constitutional limits was a key factor in the Court's holding. The
Court articulated this concern by saying:
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal penalties
provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that removes the jury
from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant
receive if punished according to
to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
169
the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.

The Court made clear that they were not arguing that trial practices
cannot change over time, but felt the need to protect against the erosion of the jury right. 1 70 The Apprendi decision was described by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in this manner: "Today's decision, far
from being a sharp break with the past, marks nothing more than a
return to the status quo ante-the status quo that reflected the origi17 1
Thus, a shifting
nal meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."
role is clearly
jury's
the
views
orientation in the way the Court
evident.
The Apprendi Court had difficulty reaching an agreement over how
72
to apply its return to the "original meaning"1 doctrine within a
death penalty context because of the range of recent precedents within
that forum that rely on the judicial determination of sentencing factors. The most prominent of these problems is the decision not to
overrule Walton in Apprendi. However, other concerns are raised
which remain to be resolved, such as the treatment of mitigating fac73
tors within a scheme requiring a reasonable doubt determination.1
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 479 n.5.
Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring). This argument reflects the classic death eligibility classification.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 490, 501 (Thomas, J., concurring), 542 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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Specifically, the majority and Justice Thomas, in concurrence, remarked on the distinction between mitigators and aggravators in
terms of the standard of proof required for their demonstration and
whether those distinctions are implicated by Apprendi's holding.
Thomas asserted that a "'crime' includes every fact that is by law a
basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact
that mitigates punishment),"174 thus demonstrating his belief that
the core crime and the aggravating factor alone constitute the aggravated crime.
However, Justice O'Connor, in dissent, described this distinction
as "pure formalism," because "whether a fact is responsible for an increase or decrease in punishment rests in the eye of the beholder."175
For example, death penalty statutes commonly allow a defendant's
prior history of violent offenses to serve as an aggravating circumstance, while the absence of such a record can serve as a mitigating
circumstance. O'Connor seems to view this distinction as "pure formalism," because the presence of a given fact is often termed an aggravator, while the absence of that given fact is just as often
considered a mitigator.176 O'Connor voiced a suspicion that the pure
formalism of the majority's distinction belied a more far-reaching constitutional principle "that any fact (other than prior conviction) that
has the effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum punishment
beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."177 O'Connor's emphasis on the
phrase "in real terms" would seem to suggest an emphasis on the ultimate sentencing determination, not just death eligibility. Thus, her
argument that the natural consequence of these decisions is an expansion of the jury's role to factfinding related to mitigators seems clear
and persuasive.
Although this debate between the five members of the majority
and the four dissenters hinged largely on concern for the ongoing propriety of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it raises questions about
how the Court is likely to treat mitigating factors within future challenges to capital sentencing schemes. Thus, if O'Connor's logic is persuasive to other Court members, there is a good chance that the role of
the jury will be expanded by future decisions.
B.

Ring's Unanswered Questions and Implications

O'Connor's recognition of the yin-yang nature of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, as well as the pure formalism of the Court's
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
542-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
542.
543-44.
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current distinction, demonstrates the feasibility of a principled resolution to the unanswered questions in Ring. Although Justice O'Connor
has repeatedly asserted her disfavor with Apprendi, the logic of her
observations is undeniable with regard to the formalism distinguishing between aggravators and mitigators in the capital context, and
that logic may prove persuasive in future deliberations. That such
questions will arise in the future is a near certainty based on the language of Ring. Specifically, the Court's new emphasis on the effect of
the sentencing factors, as opposed to their stated form, along with the
desire to establish a principled basis for structuring criminal statutes,
would seem to suggest the possibility of subsequent changes to death
penalty jurisprudence.
Ring itself provides little explicit insight into the prospective treatment of capital sentencing schemes like Nebraska's because of the
78
narrow scope of Timothy Ring's claim. 1 Because the Court explicitly
reserved determination of certain implicated doctrines, observers have
notice of shaky ground, but have no guidance about the resolution of
those problem areas. Such problem areas include the ongoing viability of judicial determination of prior convictions, the distinction between aggravators and mitigators, the judicial determination of the
ultimate sentence in capital cases, a state supreme court's ability to
reweigh aggravators and mitigators after one aggravator has been
struck, and the constitutional infirmity of an indictment by a Grand
Jury that does not present the full scope of the crime charged.
Despite the Court's resistance to determine issues not before it, the
Court has not demonstrated this same restraint in foreshadowing future changes. A number of considerations suggest that footnote
four 1 79 can be viewed as a premonition of changes to come. One point
to consider is the fact that the Court has alluded to its desire to overrule Almendarez-Torres, one of the doctrines reserved for later consideration by the Ring Court. Specifically, in Apprendi, the Court
described the decision as "at best an exceptional departure from ...
historic practice" and recognized that "it is arguable that Almendarez180
Despite these comments, the
Torres was incorrectly decided."
Court declined to overrule the decision, because the facts presented in
Apprendi did not require it. The Court's reluctance to reconsider Almendarez-Torres before the facts directly demanded it bears striking
similarity to the circumstances presented by Ring. Thus, it stands to
reason that those doctrines reserved in Ring may be next for reconsideration, especially in light of comments made by concurring and dissenting Justices in the cases leading up to Ring.
178. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
180. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487, 489.
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Another factor in support of construing footnote four as foreshadowing future evolutions is the Court's reaffirmation of the fundamental concept that "'death is different."'181 The mantra that death is
different stands for the proposition that "'in the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, [the Court has] imposed special constraints on a legislature's ability to determine what facts shall lead to
what punishment."'182 Recognition of this fundamental distinction
suggests that prior dicta expressing hesitations about jury sentencing
may be ripe for reconsideration. This may be particularly true in light
of the distinct role played by the capital jury in a system where retribution is a substantial, if not primary, justification for capital
punishment. is3
An additional point of interest is the fact that Justice Breyer has
switched sides for the Ring decision because he "believe[s] that jury
sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment."18 4 He based this decision on arguments made by Justice Stevens that retribution, as the primary justification for capital
punishment, requires the jury as "more attuned to the 'community's
moral sensibility"' to act as the community's conscience when determining the ultimate question of life or death.85
The addition of a new advocate for jury sentencing within capital
cases suggests a turning tide within the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and lends credence to the possibility of impending shifts in the Constitutional permissibility of judicial sentencing in
capital cases. The expansion of the jury's role may be justified
through expansion of either Sixth or Eighth Amendment doctrines.
Although Justice Breyer's advocacy for a right to jury sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment may or may not catch on among the
remaining Justices, it is likely to encourage new challenges on these
grounds. Challenges which could be successful depending on the way
the Court elects to interpret "community conscience."
Further, the advent of the Supreme Court's response to Ring's unanswered questions is pressed by each subsequent development in
this area. One of the most recent developments occurred thanks to the
circuit split created by the Ninth Circuit opinion of Summerlin v.
Stewart,186 which retroactively applied Ring's new sentencing man181. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, Ring (No.
01-488)).
182. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
183. The role of retribution in the capital sentencing scheme and the concomitant argument for a more substantial jury presence in capital cases is discussed further
infra section III.C.
184. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 615-16 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
186. 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
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date, while other Circuitsl 8 7 had limited Ring to proactive application.
The Court's reply in the form of Schriro v. Summerlin,18 8 presented
the opportunity to provide an additional glimpse into both the Court's
perspective on the proper scope of the jury and its justification for that
perspective with reference to the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. In
making the substantive versus procedural call required by retroactivity doctrine, the Court's analysis could have provided insight into
whether it will adopt a more expansive definition of the jury's role.
However, the Court, instead, chose the safer route of ambivalence: endorsing and reiterating the importance of the jury right while at the
same time declaring it a procedural right. The Schriro Court demonstrated this indecisiveness by stating:
[Alithough "the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and
repression[,] . .. '[wle would not assert... that every criminal trial-or any
particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may
never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury."' [In DeStefano
v. Woods, w]e concluded that "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury
trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment
18 9
right to jury trial."

Thus, in Schriro, the Court seemed determined, once again, to exemplify judicial restraint and limit its holding to the case at hand, leaving open the future of the jury right in capital sentencing. Despite the
success of this first evasive maneuver, the Court will not always be so
lucky. Now seems the optimum time for the Court to respond to
Ring's unanswered questions once and for all. However, this will be
no easy task, and the gravity of its implications will make it all the
more difficult.
C.

Grounds for Expansion: Sixth or Eighth Amendment?

Rather than adopting a wait-and-see approach, it is helpful to analyze the clues the Supreme Court has provided and also those sources
Justices purport to consult when evaluating the proper jurisprudential course to pursue. Since both Sixth Amendment and Eighth
Amendment grounds have been suggested as possible bases for expanding the scope of jury involvement in capital sentencing and since
neither have been foreclosed yet, despite the opportunity presented in
Schriro, both will be explored here. Within a Sixth Amendment con187. See, e.g., Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297
F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002). The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits found Ring to be
nonretroactive, viewing it as a natural extension of Apprendi, which was deemed
strictly procedural. However, the Cannon Court implied that, had Ring been
based on the Eighth Amendment, it would be more arguably retroactive.
188. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
189. Id. at 2525-26 (quoting DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (refusing to
give retroactive effect to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)) (internal citation omitted).
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text, the Court seems to rely most heavily on the historic role of the
jury right and the Framers' intent when analyzing the scope of the
constitutional right. Similarly, Eighth Amendment analyses typically
begin with a historical analysis, although they then take into consideration factors that relate to the evolving standards of decency in society, the legitimate penal purposes for the practice in question, and
proportionality concerns. 190 The structure of this Eighth Amendment
analysis is treated differently in different cases, thus this Note will
look to the issues implicated by these factors generally.
1.

Retribution and the Community Conscience

When considering these factors, it is important to note that one of
the most common arguments in support of the jury involves the link it
provides "'between contemporary community values and the penal
system."'1 9 1 Various terms have been used to refer to this role, but at
its core this notion seems to carry normative connotations. 1 92 The
Court's concern for normative connotations intimates the justificatory
role that retribution plays in the Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence.
The desire to integrate the community conscience into capital punishment decisions has implications on the jury's role from both a Sixth
and an Eighth Amendment perspective. From a Sixth Amendment
perspective, the jury has historically served as an additional check
and balance on overreaching State action by providing a vehicle for
introducing community values into capital decisionmaking. 193 Within
an Eighth Amendment context, it is the driving force of the analysis
because of its "central if not dispositive place in judging whether punishments are disproportionate or not."19 4 For this reason, this Note
evaluates the historic role of the jury as a necessary first step in both
Sixth and Eighth Amendment analyses, and then proceeds on to consideration of other Eighth Amendment factors. Because the Court has
made it clear through its emphasis on the community conscience that
190. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death penalty
as it was administered at that time constituted cruel and unusual punishment
using this type of analysis).
191. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
192. See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 n.32 (1987) (using the phrase
.conscience of the community"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984)
(using the phrase, 'community's voice"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 297-98 (1976) (plurality opinion) (referring to "social values" and "societal
acceptance"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 181, 190 (plurality opinion) (referring to
.public attitudes" and "community values"); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 (using
the phrase "community values" and "conscience of the community").
193. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
194. Norman J. Finkel, et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV.Sci. & L. 5, 19 (1994).
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retribution is a primary and perhaps vital justification for capital punishment, examination of legitimate penal purposes served by the practice will not be explored extensively, independent of this concept.
Instead, empirical research prompting scholarly commentators' views
on the judge-versus-jury debate is explored at greater length for the
purpose of the evolving standards of decency and proportionality
factors.195
However, before the implications of the community conscience can
be evaluated in light of their court-mandated tests, the ambiguity of
the Court's definition of community conscience must be noted. Commentators have observed that the Supreme Court's language describing this "community conscience" notion can be approached from three
different perspectives. Each of these three perspectives suggests19a6
somewhat different role for the jury in capital sentencing decisions.
First, it can be argued that a jury is to serve as a representative sample of the community, so that each juror will bring to the sentencing
discussions his own perspective. Thus, any decision made within that
forum would be roughly representative of the decision that society as a
whole would make. Second, it can be argued that a jury composed of
twelve citizens of the community is better prepared to set aside the
perspectives of the individuals and identify the consensus of the community than would be a single judge who is sheltered from the community by her unique standing as an educated legal scholar. Third, it
can be argued that the community conscience can be determined from
those laws that a community enacts through its legislative representatives to define the standards with which the community expects its
members to conform. This third premise favors judicial sentencing, in
that judges have historically been the arbiters of legal interpretation
and would arguably be best suited for this form of community conscience application. The other two approaches suggest the propriety
of jury sentencing in that if the layperson's perspective on justice or
desert is valued, then the layperson himself is likely to be the best
gauge.
This debate is very clear in Spaziano v. Florida.197 There, the majority stated that "[i]mposing the sentence in individual cases is not
the sole or even the primary vehicle through which the community's
195. Although different justices assign different weights and degrees of relevance to
empirical research, this Note explores the contributions of this field primarily
with a view towards the findings' implications on the best interpretation of "community conscience."
196. Robert F. Schopp, Reconciling "Irreconcilable"Capital Punishment Doctrine as
Comparative and Noncomparative Justice, 53 FLA. L. REV. 475, 508-12 (2001).

197. 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding that a trial court's imposition of the death penalty
over the life imprisonment recommendation of the jury did not violate the Eighth
Amendment or the Sixth Amendment because there is no constitutional guarantee for jury sentencing).
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voice can be expressed," because that decision is reviewable by an appellate court and because the legislature provides the structure for
that decision.1 98 The Spaziano Court asserted that "[t]he community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when the
death penalty is authorized and the particular circumstances in which
death is appropriate are defined."199 In contrast, the minority 2 00 asserted that "capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical
judgment."2 01 The minority argued that if the justification for capital
punishment rests on expression of the community's moral sensibilities, and thus retribution, then it follows "that a representative cross
section of the community must be given the responsibility for making
that decision." 20 2 This debate still rages, although members of the
Court seem to use these differing perspectives interchangeably at
times. This ambivalence suggests that the Court has not come to a
final conclusion on this issue.
Because the perspective adopted has implications for the proper
jury role, an understanding of these concepts is needed to determine
the appropriate sentencer in capital cases. Specifically, basic laws of
statistical analysis suggest that a twelve-member subset of the population is more likely to be representative of the population and community as a whole than would be a single member. 20 3 However, it is
worth noting that jury selection, and capital jury selection in particular, does not seek to provide a truly representative sample of the population.204 Arguments have also been made that lay jurors are
distinguishable from the average judge in other ways. Specifically,
factors such as age, education, and experience with the subject matter
are commonly asserted. 20 5 However, if the laws of the community can
adequately serve this function, then these arguments are less compelling because of the judiciary's traditional role in interpreting law.
198. Id. at 462.
199. Id.
200. Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall concurred in part and
dissented in part.
201. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id.
203. See generally CHARLES STANGOR, RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1998); see also Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of
the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1409, 1426 (1985) (The court
stated that "the decision to impose a death sentence is primarily a question about
community desires for retribution. As a reflection of community sentiments, the
feelings of a panel of twelve are, by definition, a more accurate measure than are
the feelings of one judge.").
204. The practice of life and death qualification for capital jurors as a safeguard for
impartiality necessarily eliminates certain segments of the population, thus diminishing its representativeness. See infra notes 241, 242.
205. See generally Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41-59
(1980).
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The Spaziano majority seems comfortable in allowing each method
to play a role in determining the status of the community conscience,
such that "the purpose of the death penalty is not frustrated by, or
inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in
individual cases is determined by a judge." 206 However, the historic
role of the jury may provide insight as to the delineation of roles
played by judges and jurors within the capital context. Thus, the historic role of the jury provides a proper starting point.
2.

The HistoricRole of the Jury: Checks and Balances

The jury as an institution of democratic control within the judicial
branch was easily the most hallowed and least controversial tenet of
the Bill of Rights at the time of its passage. 20 7 Commentator Akhil
Amar, in his in-depth analysis of the historical context of the Bill of
Rights, has noted that juries in various forms were the explicit subject
of three amendments and were implicitly involved in many more. 208
Additionally, in the twenty years that followed the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases was
the only right secured in all state constitutions. 2 09 This is because the
jury was seen as playing a pivotal role in protecting ordinary citizens
from the overreaching of government through the judiciary.2 10 For instance, the jury system has been described as "fundamentally populist
and majoritarian: '[t]he institution of the jury.., places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed, ....
and not in that of the

government.'"211
Commentators have gone so far as to describe juries as the "'lower
judicial bench' in a bicameral judiciary" 2 12 which is "more necessary
than representatives in the legislature." 2 13 The jury's role in expressing community values has received special recognition within the
criminal justice context and capital sentencing decisions particu206. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462-63.
207. AMAR,supra note 146, at 83. See also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867,
869-71 (1994) (describing the historical context for the Sixth Amendment and
concurrence of opinion surrounding the need for its ongoing protection).
208. AMAR,supra note 146, at 83.
209.

Id. (construing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985)).

210. Id. at 82-83 (noting the cruel punishments dealt out by the Star Chamber in
response to government criticism). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
151-52 (1968) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349-50 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
211.

AMAR, supra note 146, at 88 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN

AMERICA 293-94 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage 1945)).
212. Id. at 95 (quoting JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209 (W. Stark ed., 1950) (1814)).
213.

OF

Id. (citing Essays by a FarmerIV, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST

36-38 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
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larly.2 14 Part of this historic role encompassed the frequent exercise
of jury nullification. 2 15 Jury nullification is made possible because jurors are not obliged to justify their conclusions, and yet their decisions, with few exceptions, are unreviewable. Although it is
recognized as a settled principle of law that juries determine the facts,
while judges determine the law, throughout history juries have exercised this freedom to "both individualize the sentence and dispense
mercy" by altering the facts to find defendants guilty of lesser included
offenses.216

Nowhere has this power of nullification been used more frequently
than with capital offenses.217 In fact, commentators have argued that
jury nullification has played a major role in the English common law's
evolution toward murder gradations recognizing varying degrees of
culpability.21s Professor Thomas Green, after extensive study of both
the English and American jury traditions, observed that the evolution
toward recognizing different degrees of murder was forestalled because juries so frequently nullified murder charges when the sentence
of death seemed disproportionate to the crime.219 Although nullification may have a stultifying effect on the maturation of public policy, it
demonstrates the community's reluctance to sacrifice its individual
members to disproportionate application. Thus, throughout history
the jury has provided an important check on the legislative expressions of community norms, which are, by their procedural constraints,
slower to evolve. The check and balance provided by early nullification practices has now become a legitimate function under Eighth
Amendment principles valuing community sentiments in culpability
and proportionality assessments. What was once an extralegal exercise is now both legitimate and expected when performed within the
legal constraints of capital sentencing proceedings. 22 0
214. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) (recognizing
the "basic trust in lay jurors as the keystone in our system of criminal justice").
215. AMAR, supra note 146, at 96-97 (noting the "right-of the petit jury to do justice
by acquitting against the evidence").
216.

SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 30 (2d ed. 1998).

217. See Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74
MICH. L. REV. 413 (1976) (providing a history of the jury's role in the evolution of
English homicide laws); see generally THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO

CONSCIENCE 379 (1985) (exploring the "jury's role as a mitigator of capital sanctions in felony trials").
218. See supra note 217.
219. See supra note 217.
220. "The jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values
because it is so directly involved. The Court has said that 'one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making ... a selection [between life imprisonment and death for a defendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal system.'" Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
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This tradition of the jury as a check and balance has long been
recognized by the Court and the states. The United States Supreme
Court in Duncan v. Louisiana2 21 affirmed the importance of the jury's
role within criminal trials when it held that the right to jury trial was
a fundamental right for the purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. 2 22 When arriving at its conclusion, the Court looked to its
predecessors' frequent recognition of the jury's importance, the strong
support given the right by state laws, and the historical context surrounding the adoption of jury trial provisions within the federal and
state constitutions. 223 The Court was very clear about its convictions:
A right to a jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitution strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the
defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored
but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.
Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a relucover the life and liberty of the citizen to one
tance to entrust plenary powers
22 4
judge or to a group of judges.

The Duncan Court also described the jury trial right as corresponding
to a spectrum of crime, wherein the less serious the crime, the less
pertinent the right, such that trials for petty offenses do not require a
jury; whereas, the more serious the crime, the more immediate the
right.225 This would suggest that, from a Sixth Amendment perspective, capital cases, because of their placement at the most serious end
of that spectrum, would dictate the most stringent application of the
right to a jury trial. Thus, because death is different and because capital cases dictate the most stringent application of the jury trial right,
that right can be properly extended into the sentencing determination.
As previously discussed, modern death penalty jurisprudence has
repeatedly described the primary function of the jury as interjecting
the conscience of the community into the sentencing decision. 226 Further, many have cited Duncan as support for preserving the jury right.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

519 n.15 (1970)). For a review of cases emphasizing the importance of community sentiments in capital cases, see supra, note 192 and accompanying text.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 153-57.
Id. at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 160-61.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1970).
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Thus, by all indications, the Court conceives of the jury modernly as
performing the same function as it did historically: interjecting the
community's normative understanding of culpability and proportionality into the proceedings as a means of curbing abuses by the State
and its actors.
Much of the Court's logic in support of defining the jury's role in
this way focuses on the use of retribution as a justificatory basis for
capital punishment. It seems that the Court has also at times supported the jury's community conscience role as affording the defendant an avenue for the interjection of mercy, either in the form of
diminished culpability determinations or as an expression of reticent

doubts about the defendant's

guilt. 2 2 7

In Caldwell v. Mississippi,228

the Court considered whether it was appropriate for a trial judge to
instruct a sentencing jury about the appellate review process, concluding that it was not, because it diminished the jury's understanding of
the gravity of its decision. In Caldwell, the Court recognized a need
for sentencers, whether judge or jury, to be present during the trial to
witness the "intangibles" that cannot be gleaned from an appellate record, such as the defendant's and witness' demeanors during testimony.2 29 The Court noted that "an appellate court, unlike a capital
sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of
death in the first instance. Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few can be gleaned from an appellate record."2 30 This seems to suggest that the Court values
sentencers' individual impressions of those presenting evidence, and
that to miss the opportunity to form such impressions does a disservice to capital defendants.
This has potentially serious implications for Nebraska's use of the
three-judge panel, because, at best, only one of the three judges has
been privy to all of the evidence adduced at trial. It also suggests
problems with Nebraska's new practice of impaneling juries for the
sentencing phase that were not privy to trial evidence. 23 1 With the
three-judge panel, the nontrial judges may read the appellate record
and observe the witnesses presented at the sentencing phase, but
many of the intangibles with which the Court is concerned will be unavailable to two-thirds of the sentencing panel. Further, a potential
problem arises from the fact that the remaining two panel judges may
inadvertently rely on the trial judge's opinion and impressions when
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985).
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Id. at 330.
Id.
However, within the jury context, a sentencing jury is impaneled only after the
defendant waives his right to jury trial. There are fewer constitutional implications when defendants knowingly and voluntarily waive a right, than when the
State makes that decision for them.
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23 2
This type of reliance would essenmaking the final determination.
tially moot the utility of the three-judge panel, because the trial
judge's opinion would likely form the basis for the decision, with the
other two judges merely following his or her lead. In this sense the
legislature's efforts to make this sentencing determination more reliable by emulating the jury's "two heads are better than one" logic backfires because of the inherent differences between judges and juries.
Within both Sixth and Eighth Amendment analyses, the historic
role and function of the jury is a primary consideration. With regard
to capital sentencing, it seems that the Court has demonstrated that
the jury's function as an additional check and balance on the State
and its actors, including its judges, is a paramount consideration.
Within a Sixth Amendment framework, it appears that the Court can
easily rely on Duncan's spectrum analogy in combination with its recognition that death is different to justify extending the jury trial right
into the sentencing determination. Likewise, within an Eighth
Amendment analysis, the first hurdle has been cleared, because the
jury has clearly played a consistently prominent role in capital cases
by interjecting community norms into culpability and proportionality
determinations. However, in order to fully justify Justice Breyer's
Eighth Amendment projections, other factors must be considered.

3. Commentators' Recommendations: Judge Versus Jury
As previously stated, the Court looks to a series of factors in its
2 33
One factor that weighs heavily deals
Eighth Amendment analysis.
with the evolving standards of decency in society. It has been said
that the "'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro23 4
In conducting this analysis, the
gress of a maturing society.'"
objective evidence whenconsider
to
need
the
Court has emphasized
ever possible. The Court has elaborated by asserting that the "'clearvalues is the
est and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
23 5
While some Juslegislation enacted by the country's legislatures.'"
tices would conclude the analysis with legislative enactments, a ma2 36
stated that "objective
jority of the Court in Atkins v. Virginia,
evidence, though of great importance, did not 'wholly determine' the
232. It is arguable that the problem of one judge dominating the deliberations is as
likely to hinge on personality characteristics as the status of the trial judge, yet
this does not address the Court's concern with witnessing and taking into consideration "intangibles."
233. See supra section III.C.
234. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1958)).
235. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
236. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the
Court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question."' 2 37
Specifically, the majority in Atkins stated that the proper course is to
"first review the judgment of the legislatures that have addressed [the
issue] and then consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with their
judgment."238 Thus, this Note will do the same.
There is little doubt that Nebraska is in the minority in its approach to capital sentencing. In Ring, the Court noted that "[o]f the 38
States with capital punishment, 29 generally commit sentencing decisions to juries," and at the time of Ring, "[o]ther than Arizona, only
four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges." 23 9 Now, Nebraska is in
league with only one other state-Montana-24o in allowing the court
to impose a death sentence after the jury makes the death eligibility
determination. Thus, with regard to the judgment of the country's
legislatures, Nebraska is clearly outnumbered. However, because the
Court has expressed an interest in considering for itself the logic behind the states' judgment, this analysis is not complete. The Court
has often looked to empirical research to inform its decisions regarding evolving standards of decency, and again, this Note will do so as
well.
Commentators have struggled to determine if the decisionmaking
process varies in any appreciable way for judges and jurors. One
source for information on this topic is the Capital Jury Project ("CJP").
CJP is a multistate research effort by academics of varying disciplines
aimed at exploring the dynamics of juror decisionmaking in capital
cases. 24 1 Project members conducted extensive interviews with over
1,000 jurors who had served on capital cases in different states. CJP
provides many insights into the complications arising from the rigorous demands of modern death penalty jurisprudence on lay jurors.
Specifically, CJP results suggest that, despite due process requirements, capital jurors tend to be less than impartial.242 In theory, the
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
Id. at 313.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
MONT.CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2003).
For a comprehensive summary of the Project's findings and a bibliography of
other sources analyzing the Project's data, see John H. Blume, et al., Lessons

from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144

(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
242. The United States Supreme Court has held that as a matter of due process, criminal defendants and capital defendants, particularly, have the right to a fair trial
by a panel of impartial and indifferent jurors. The Court has defined partiality as
when a "juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)
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2 44
process demanded
"death-qualification" 24 3 and "life-qualification"
personal
by the Supreme Court should all but eliminate jurors whose
245
life or
the
of
consideration
impartial
and
fair
a
beliefs would hinder
the
as
death
described
jurors
of
percent
fourteen
yet
death decision,
described
only appropriate punishment for murder, while two percent
2 46
death as never an appropriate punishment for murder.
The CJP also demonstrated that capital jurors tend not to understand the law they are charged with applying. Jurors tend to misunderstand the role and definition of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and to believe that the same rules apply to both. For
instance, CJP suggested that jurors tend to misunderstand jury instructions and seemingly fall back on popular culture representations
24 7
Most jurors believe that aggravatof the way the system operates.
a reasonable doubt and that the
beyond
proved
be
ing factors must
248
However, jurors
jury decision must be unanimous in this regard.
tend to think these same rules apply to mitigating factors and also
miss the distinction between statutory and nonstatutory sentencing
250
factors. 2 49 These juror misconceptions violate the Lockett doctrine,
nearly unqualified opportunity
which affords a capital defendant2 5the
1
to proffer evidence in mitigation.
According to some commentators, these juror misconceptions also
suggest the possibility that jurors may impose death sentences based
on facts that would lead them to impose life sentences if they under-

243.

244.

245.
246.

247.
248.
249.
250.

251.

(reaffirming the impartiality requirement in capital cases after reviewing precedents from the criminal context generally)).
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (suggesting that jurors who state
unambiguously that they would vote only for life upon conviction of a capital offense can be challenged for cause); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(upholding the exclusion of prospective jurors who stated unequivocal opposition
to the death penalty).
See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (holding that a capital defendant may challenge for
cause prospective jurors who would automatically impose death upon conviction
of a capital offense).
For a definition of impartiality, see supra note 242.
Blume et al., supra note 241, at 151-52. Note also that this CJP datasuggested
this to be a conservative estimate, because when the crime was described in
greater detail ('[al planned, premeditated murder" vs. "convicted murderers") the
number of jurors who described death as the only appropriate punishment increased dramatically.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 154-56.
Id. at 156-59.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (requiring that the defendant in
capital cases be allowed to present to a sentencer any and all mitigating
information).
There are ambiguities about the intended scope of the defendant's right to introduce mitigating evidence.
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stood the law better.252 This misunderstanding has been blamed on
the fact that "mitigating" and "aggravating" as legal terms of art, are
unfamiliar to most jurors and the terms' common definitions typically
lend little aid to the lay juror.2 53
The most interesting implications of juror misunderstandings
come into play when considering the way the jurors interpret and employ these factors. Specifically, various commentators have suggested
that nonstatutory factors may be the most influential in terms of sentencing outcomes. 2 54 Key nonstatutory mitigators are said to include
the defendant's remorse, the defendant's affect, the victim's family's
affect, sentence certainty, and the decisionmakers' views of the death
penalty. Interestingly, the CJP suggested that many of these same
sentencing factors are heavily relied upon in terms of their aggravating characteristics. This lends credence to Justice O'Connor's recognition of the yin-yang feature of these factors, whereby the presence of
one factor can serve as an aggravator, while the absence of that same
factor can serve as a mitigator.
Two of the most influential factors are the defendant's remorsefulness and the defendant's future dangerousness.255 When jurors
thought the defendant was remorseful or sorry, they tended to vote for
life, when they thought the defendant had little remorse, they tended
to vote for death.256 Similarly, if they thought the defendant
presented a substantial risk of future danger, they were more apt to
vote for death than if they viewed the defendant as posing a lesser
risk.257 Interestingly, when assessing future dangerousness, jurors
tended to look to both the seriousness of the crime and the remorsefulness of the defendant, in addition to the defendant's opportunity to
commit future crimes if not given the death penalty. Thus, in this
sense, jurors' perceptions of remorsefulness played a major role in the
death determination.
Also of interest is the fact that jurors tend to grossly underestimate
the duration of life sentences, which in turn, impacts the likelihood of
a death sentence, since the less time a juror thinks the defendant will
252. Blume et al., supra note 241, at 175 (citing Sheri Seidman Diamond & Judith N.
Levi, Improving Decisionson Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions,79
JuDicATURE 224, 231 (1996); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructionsin Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455,
463 (1995)).
253. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionariesand Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 12-15 (noting also the frequency with which
capital jurors have requested dictionaries during deliberation or a further definition from the judge).
254. Wiener, supra note 14, at 771; see also Blume et al., supra note 241, at 161-68.
255. Wiener, supra note 14, at 771.
256. Blume et al., supra note 241, at 164-67.
257. Id.
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2 58
Accordserve, the greater likelihood he or she will vote for death.
ing to CJP, "jurors on average estimated that defendants not sentenced to death would be imprisoned for only nineteen years, eleven
less than the time a defendant would in fact be required to serve [in
that jurisdiction] before he would become eligible for parole, let alone
be actually released." 2 59 This demonstrates another pertinent circumstance wherein jurors misunderstand the framework of the law that
they are to take into consideration and apply.
The incomprehensibility of juror instructions is something that
likewise infects the guilt determination phase of trials. Further, it
does so without attracting a significant degree of attention from the
legal community, despite the fact that commentators have persistently argued that this problem can be easily remedied through the use
260
Such instructions have been
of more juror-friendly instructions.
to improve juror compreresearch
demonstrated through empirical
26 1
Thus, proper jury instructions
hensibility in specific situations.
could arguably rectify the problems denoted thus far.
For all their frailties, juries arguably may still provide superior
representation of community values in the nature of capital sentencing context. Although arguments have been made that judicial sentencing would lead to greater consistency, based on the fact that trial
than jurors, 26 2
judges are arguably more experienced in sentencing 263
These comsome commentators have challenged this assertion.
mentators have noted that capital sentencing is highly distinguishable from traditional sentencing in both its rarity and its structure.
Specifically, the typical trial judge sees so few capital murder cases
over the course of his or her career that the opportunity to develop

258. Id. at 167.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving CriminalJustice: Making Jury Instructions Understandable for American Jurors, 33 INT'L
REv. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 97, 107 (1984) (finding that "legally untrained people
have difficulty understanding or applying pattern instructions"); see also Weiner,
supra note 14, at 768-69 n.37 (2002) (providing a bibliography of studies on the
comprehensibility of capital jury instructions); see generally Wiener et al., supra
note 252.
261. See Wiener, supra note 14, at 768-69 n.37 (providing a bibliography of studies on
the comprehensibility of capital jury instructions); see generally Wiener et al.,
supra note 252.
262. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (upholding Florida's jury-override
sentencing scheme). It is interesting to note that one of the reasons that the
Court supported the jury-override system was that judges were adhering to the
stated policy of the giving capital defendants a second chance for life with the
trial judge by vacating death sentences that had been determined as inappropriate. Id. at 253; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977) (stating the
second-chance policy).
263. Radelet, supra note 203, at 1426; Gillers, supra note 205, at 57-59.
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consistency is diminished.264 Further, the litany of typical sentencing
considerations265 differs from the structured nature of capital sentencing factors. Thus the judge's greater knowledge and experience
are not called upon in the capital context. These commentators argue
that consistency is best attained through the appellate review process
because of the need for reliance on the jury's community conscience
during sentencing. 26 6
Another criticism of judicial sentencing involves the age-old concern of whether the independent judiciary provides the public sufficient protection against abuses of power. Some commentators argue
that the Framers' concerns that judges would be "'too responsive to
the voice of higher authority'"267 still thrive today, but that the
"'higher authority'" has evolved to become "'a political climate in
which judges who covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain
judges-must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty."268
This has been argued because judges face election in most states that
employ the death penalty. 2 6 9 The form of these elections varies between election by the state legislature, partisan or nonpartisan election by the people, and retention election by the people. Nebraska is a
retention state. Election in any form can be said to erode judicial impartiality, because the judge arguably has a direct interest in the outcome of certain cases. 2 70
The most prominent example of this trend can be seen in the states
with jury-override sentencing schemes: Alabama, Florida, and Indiana, where "there is no better way to demonstrate toughness on crime
than through the use of the judicial override."271 In each state, a wide
disparity exists between overrides used to overturn death recommendations and those used to overturn life recommendations, such that
jury recommendations of life were abandoned much more frequently
264. Radelet, supra note 203, at 1426 (citing Gillers, supra note 205, at 57-59).
265. Gillers describes typical sentencing considerations as: 'the availability of rehabilitative resources in the jurisdiction's jails and prisons; the nature of various diversion programs; community support services; the competence of probation
authorities; the probable amount of time that will be served for a given sentence;
sentences imposed by both the sentencing judge and other judges for similar offenders; and recidivism rates for different crimes." Gillers, supra note 205, at 57.
266. Gillers, supra note 205, at 60; Radelet, supra note 203, at 1426.
267. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1998)).
268. Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999
Wis. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Harris, 513 U.S. at
519-20).
269. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 759, 776 (1995).
270. Burnside, supra note 268, at 1045-47 (noting possible due process violations in
cases where a judge could lose his or her job based on the outcome of a case).
271. Id. at 1039.
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27 2
What is more disconcerting,
than jury recommendations of death.
is the finding that the overall number of jury overrides increases in
election years, 2 73 and that some judges actually ask for capital cases
come election time, to get their names in the press and to demonstrate
2 74
These pressures are not illutheir "tough on crime" philosophies.
sory, community activist groups and political parties have spearheaded campaigns for judicial removal based on death penalty decipoliticians have made it clear that this type of removal is
sions, 275 and
27 6
a reality.
Although jury-override states provide a poignant example of concern for judicial appearances, these concerns are in no way limited to
override states or even to direct election states. In fact, some commentators have argued that retention elections, like those held in Nebraska, are even worse than direct elections because the absence of a
direct opponent allows various groups to target the judge without re277
There are a number of solutions
gard for the possible replacement.
from eliminating elections
ranging
concerns,
proposed for impartiality
altogether, to restricting judicial deference in politically sensitive matters, or assigning sensitive political matters to those not facing election. These recommendations remain largely untested; thus it is
difficult to assess their efficacy. However, the possibility of returning
to a more legitimately independent judiciary by eliminating election
procedures is another possible remedy.
Based on a cursory review of commentators' suggestions in this
realm, it seems that both judges and juries have their shortcomings.
This leaves the Supreme Court with a choice between juror miscomprehension and politicized judges. In light of the fact that both series
of problems are arguably somewhat remediable, one is left to consider
the Framer's intent for the jury as a check and balance on the State's
overzealous actions. It would seem that if judges are acting in the
manner that the Framer's feared, then the jury as an additional check

272. Ingrid A Holewinski, "InherentlyArbitrary and Capricious".An EmpiricalAnalysis of Variations Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 231, 237-38. (2002) (noting that Alabama's ratio of life overrides to death
overrides was almost ten-to-one, while Florida's was three-to-one, and Indiana's
was two-to-one). Also, it is interesting to note that Delaware is the only override
state that does not have judicial elections and they are also the only state to only
override death sentences. Burnside, supra note 268, at 1042-43.
273. Burnside, supra note 268, at 1039; Holewinski, supra note 272, at 238.
274. See Burnside, supra note 268, at 1037-38 (providing numerous other examples of
judicial campaigning).
275. See id. at 1035-38; see also Bright & Keenan, supra note 269, at 779-93.
276. Governor Don Sundquist of Tennessee made these comments after the removal of
a judge following an organized campaign: "Should a judge look over his shoulder
about whether they're [sic] going to be thrown out of office? I hope so." Burnside,
supra, note 268, at 1037.
277. Id. at 1042.
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and balance seems the more defensible position. However, before
drawing specific conclusions, it is best to consider Nebraska-specific
information as well.
The final consideration then, will revolve around a specific look at
Nebraska and the way its system has been operating in light of the
commentators' concerns just enumerated. A recent study by David
Baldus and colleagues took an in-depth look at Nebraska's pre-Ring
factor-weighing sentencing scheme.278 The study indicates that Nebraska's capital sentencing system appears to have been functioning
basically as it should, without systematic disparate treatment between offenders.279 However, a pattern did emerge that suggested
disparate treatment on the basis of victim socioeconomic status
("SES"), such that defendants charged with killing victims with high
SES were more likely to receive the death penalty than those killing
low-SES victims. 28 0 Another relevant finding involved geographic disparities in the rates that capital cases advance to a penalty trial which
were not attributable to defendant culpability. These disparities
demonstrate that the rate in the major urban counties was substantially higher than it was in more rural areas. 28 ' However, Baldus and
his colleagues concluded that judicial sentencing policies have tended
to offset and partially cancel out this effect, because the sentencing
rates of judges in urban areas are slightly below the statewide
norm. 28 2 This finding has implications for the race of defendants, because most of Nebraska's minority defendants were prosecuted in urban areas. Thus, were it not for the judicial offset, more minorities
would likely have received death sentences.
Commentators have noted the irony of Ring in this context. 28 3 Because Nebraska's prior use of pure judicial sentencing served to offset
and balance out racial disparities, it is possible that more racial disparities in sentencing may emerge when juries are the final arbiters of
the sentencing decision, or at least of the aggravating component of
that decision. However, it is possible that the judges' role in proportionality review would facilitate the perpetuation of this balancing
function.
278. David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administrationof
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience
(1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002) (providing a complete overview of the
study, its objectives, results, and implications).
279. Id. at 661-62. The authors note that their results "provide support for the Proffitt hypothesis that judicial sentencing is superior to jury sentencing in terms of
arbitrariness and comparative justice" because of the absence of racial disparities. Id.; see also id. at 656-59.
280. Id. at 607-23.
281. Id. at 631-33.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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In addition to the post-Ring effect on defendants, it is important to
consider what effect the expansion of jury sentencing would have on
the disparities relating to victims. Some commentators have argued
that the consciously and deliberately expressed values of the community would not likely support such discriminatory action toward victims. 28 4 However, the fluidity of the Lockett doctrine, requiring
nearly unrestrained introduction of mitigating circumstances may
open the door for implicit consideration of such factors. The possibility
that the "community conscience" may sanction mitigation based on
victim characteristics as opposed to offender characteristics is an unpleasant possibility, but a real one, in light of the history of jury nullification. 28 5 However, it has been argued that the idea of community
conscience also encompasses the notion of community biases, such
that even if these considerations are improper, they are the community's notions nonetheless and are probably pervasively held within
that community's entire criminal justice system, including its judges
and the laws interpreted by those judges. 28 6 Thus, in this sense, the
concept of pervasive bias can be viewed as an indictment of both
judges and juries. Considerations such as this suggest that the
United States Supreme Court has much to consider when reevaluating the unanswered questions left pending in Ring.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The death penalty has historically been one of the most controversial institutions in American society, while the jury has typically been
viewed as among the least controversial. These two institutions have
intersected and come to a head in the newest line of U.S. Supreme
Court death penalty precedents. The collision of these two forces has
swept the nation, leaving dozens of state legislatures scrambling to
address the aftermath. The Court has suggested that a doctrinal shift
is impending with regard to the extent and nature of the jury's role in
capital sentencing procedure, but has revealed very little as to the
scope of this shift. This ambiguity leaves states like Nebraska in
limbo as to the propriety of their current sentencing schemes and
raises questions as to where and when the court will resolve this ambiguity. Nebraska is left in a particularly curious position, because, in
addition to the cryptic foreshadowing of Ring, the Gales court dealt
with a limited situation and could do little more than address the facts
284. Wiener, supra note 14, at 772.
285. See Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoatingthe Jury, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7 (1997)
(arguing in favor of the practice of jury nullification, while noting the "bad rap"
the practice gets because of its frequent use to acquit those suspected of racial
violence in the South).
286. Id. at 48; see also Wiener, supra note 14, at 773.
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before it, while qualifying its holding through recognition of the tenuous nature of U.S. Supreme Court precedents in this field.
Although consideration of the principles underlying the recent doctrinal shift suggest a preference for substance over form when defining elements necessary to establish death eligibility and a preference
for a principled approach to capital sentencing decisionmaking, many
of the Court's recent doctrines could be implicated by pursuing such a
principled approach. The scope of doctrinal implications is likely to
hinge, at least in part, on the Court's perspective on the role of the
jury in defining the community conscience. Thus, considerations of
the historic role of the jury in capital proceedings and the process by
which judges and jurors set about making their decisions helps elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of each course.
From a historical perspective, it seems that the jury has always
served as an additional check and balance on its elective branches in
terms of the protection of its individual citizens, thus suggesting the
need for a subset of that community to fill that role. In comparison, a
review of empirical commentators suggests that neither sentencing
system is perfect, and each has distinct frailties. It is likely that Nebraska legislators have demonstrated such loyalty to judicial sentencing because of the outcome of the comprehensive capital sentencing
study conducted recently. Judges may afford a greater degree of consistency, at least in Nebraska, but problems remain because of their
inability to fulfill the historic check-and-balance role. While jurors require more precise judicial instruction to prevent the arbitrariness
and discriminatoriness that modern death penalty jurisprudence is
constitutionally bound to ward off, they provide a unique perspective,
that a number of the United States Supreme Court Justices seem to
view as an important part of capital sentencing.
Many of the unanswered questions in Ring go to the very heart of
the past decades' death penalty jurisprudence. Given these considerations, the Court's task of addressing those questions left unanswered
is unenviable. The Court has spent the past twenty-five years trying
to recover from Furman, its last highly divisive plurality opinion in
the area of capital punishment, and may very well spend the next
twenty-five trying to recover from its next highly divisive opinion in
this area.
Regardless of the daunting task before the Court, Nebraska is still
faced with the uncertainty of the future constitutionality of its capital
sentencing structure. As a preventive measure, it may be advisable to
amend the new structure during upcoming legislative sessions so as to
circumvent impending problems. It would seem that an appropriate
compromise between Nebraska's loyalty to judicial sentencing and the
likely constitutional demands of greater jury involvement could be
reached. For example, a possible remedy would be to provide the trial
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jury with structured discretion in the selection phase by allowing
them to weigh the already adduced aggravators against any mitigators they might identify, giving the jury the authority to determine the
ultimate sentence. If the jury's findings were presented in a written
statement describing its decision, a three-judge panel could then conduct a thorough proportionality review to ensure that inappropriate
factors and considerations, such as victim race or SES, were not being
employed.
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court's footnotes and
dicta will prove to be foreshadowing or just footnotes and dicta. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court's recognition of the possibility for
change and the prospect of another special session are arguably sufficient motivators to take another look at the state's capital sentencing
scheme.
Sarah P. Newell
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